At Arkam, we are interested in frameworks that help societies, institutions and markets build long-term resilience. Trust is one such foundational layer. Without it, even well-intended policy interventions can face resistance, delay or breakdown, especially during periods of crisis.
This piece applies the doughnut economics framework to the public trust crisis, looking at how governments can balance institutional confidence with democratic checks, citizen participation and accountability. It argues that sustainable economic development depends not only on policy design, but also on the trust infrastructure that allows policy to work.
“The Doughnut Framework to Address the Crisis of Public Trust
Introduction
As public health experts from around the world urged citizens to stay cooped up inside their homes, former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Thomas Friedman, tweeted in support of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. He said, “The threat to COVID control from protesting outside is tiny compared to the threat to COVID control created when governments act in ways that lose community trust”. I do not wish to analyze the moral or political probity of this response but emphasize the relevance of trust in institutions even in the suspension of our perceived ‘normal’.
The exposition on trust can be traced as far as to the Confucian Thought (722-481 BC). When Zigong asked Confucius, what would he give up first from the three pillars of governance- food, weapons, and trust- the master guarded trust till the end (O’neill, 2002). After centuries of evolution in human civilization, the last decade has again posed this question to our world leaders with trust as the constant option. The choices made today would shape the future of generations to come, creating a pressing need for responsible capitalism and economic resilience.
Theories of Trust and Distrust
The binary thinking of the mind compels us to believe that reducing the opposite of something would increase that ‘something’; a reduction in disease would increase ‘health’; an increase in disorder would reduce order. Although we may argue against this diametric scale itself, it would be easier to work within the frame and identify the correct ‘opposites.’ As we realize that health is not the opposite of disease and chaos theory exemplifies order within disorder, the fallacies in the above examples become evident. A similar problem with the polarities of trust is often debated in philosophical circles.
Trust and distrust were treated as the “ends of a single continuum” until the last decade (Van De Walle and Frédérique, 2014). Scholars believed that an explanation of trust would intrinsically cover for distrust. However, the modern view in philosophy theorized distrust independently; the ‘lack of trust’ emerged as the new opposite of trust (Bertsou, 2019). While lack of trust is a passive and apathetic disposition towards the trustee, distrust is an active and negative disposition (Van De Walle and Frédérique, 2014). These emergent constructs can thus coexist and broaden our social inquiry from a widespread public trust crisis to active public distrust.
Democracy and Trust
Although the “habitus of trust” is relevant to many forms of government, I would restrict the scope of my study to democracy (Mistzal, 2013). When citizens place their trust in institutions, they not only expect them to fulfil their responsibilities but also accept being “vulnerable to betrayal” (McLeod, 2020). If this trust turns out to be misplaced, citizens feel betrayed and express their sentiments in the elections (Bertsou, 2019). A ‘lack of trust’ may be reduced with an increase in the efficiency of the government. However, when citizens question the ‘intent’ of the government, it can breed distrust, a much difficult plague to cure.
The Indian agricultural markets had been yearning for reforms to improve farmer earnings. Thus, when the government recently passed three agricultural bills to drive high earnings in the sector, I anticipated positive public feedback. Contrastingly, the national capital witnessed widespread protests by farmers against the bills. So, were these reforms ill-intended? Economists Abhijit Banerjee and Gita Gopinath welcomed the need for such reforms without questioning the intent of the government. However, Dr. Banerjee expressed his discontent with the timing and implementation of these reforms amidst the pandemic (2020). The government had not consulted the key stakeholders such as the farmer unions before hurriedly passing bills that affected nearly 70% of the rural population. As the protests progressed with episodic negotiations, the government failed to reassure the farmers (Agnihotri, 2021). The story that started with a sheer lack of trust culminated with an acerbic distrust, scarring the national capital with violent protests. Public institutions might have the noblest rationale behind the decisions for the citizens. However, they need to ensure that their interventions bridge the ‘trust deficit’ instead of giving rise to distrust.
The Value of Political Mistrust
Although the foregoing statements about distrust present a counterintuitive picture to the above title, political theory has emphasized the value of distrust-or mistrust-in keeping a check on governments. Rosanvallon presents an argument for “organizing distrust” as a measure to address the erosion of confidence (Schmitter, Della Porta, and Warren, 2010). A similar argument is presented by Krishnamurthy, who recalls Martin Luther King’s ‘distrust’ towards the white moderates that contributed to empowering black citizens to take action against racial supremacy (2015).
While some scholars have used ‘distrust’ and ‘mistrust’ interchangeably, others have presented strong arguments against the ‘institutionalized distrust’ theory. Nevertheless, the value of skepticism expressed either in ‘mistrust’ or ‘liberal distrust’ stands unchallenged (Bertsou, 2019). I would hereby use the term ‘mistrust’ in a positive light of checks and ‘distrust’ in the negative light as discussed before.
The year 2020 was a dark chapter in India’s human rights history. The government passed the citizenship amendment act, effectively excluding Muslims from seeking shelter in the country. As opposed to the usual protests, the protest against this bill attracted young student populations raising their voices for equality. A grave sight that emerged from the protest sites was that of mass shootings and police brutality against the students. A political leader even suggested a “Tiananmen treatment” to ‘handle’ the situation (Agarwala, 2020). Human rights watchdog, Amnesty International, claimed that the Indian government had suspended their financial accounts as revenge for their reporting against these unlawful practices (Amnesty International, 2020).
The right to dissent is the essence of democracy. It is a reflection of citizen’s non-electoral participation in the institution. While a government should strive to address the reasons for citizens’ mistrust, it should not attempt to curb their ‘nature’ of mistrust. A state of absolute trust may question the efficacy of civil society and free press in the country. Public leaders need to acknowledge that the government is not the only stakeholder for upholding democracy. Instead of suppressing mistrust, they should create channels for its communication. When the BLM protests in America or the Hathras Rape protests in India gained momentum, political leaders cited COVID to discourage gatherings. However, they offered no alternative outlets for the expression of mistrust.
The Doughnut framework – An audit for public trust
The doughnut economics model is an economic model or ‘compass’ for human progress proposed by Kate Raworth. It maps the social and ecological boundaries within the economic system to ensure sustainable economic development (Raworth, 2017). I propose that adopting a customized framework would act as a compass for governments to ‘audit’ public trust and undertake targeted public policy innovation that nurtures the same.
a. Foundation for institutional trust
The foundation for institutional trust signifies the threshold below which the citizens feel an absolute distrust for the government. This is a dangerous space as it stifles scope for reformation and hinders urgent action by the government. The anti-austerity measures in Greece were vehemently opposed as citizens had developed a high distrust for the government. We observe a similar sentiment emerging among citizens as a result of lockdown fatigue. Public leaders should refrain from “normalizing the abnormal” and acknowledge the disruptions caused by the stringent measures (2020).
b. Ceiling for checks and balances
The ceiling for checks and balances limits the overpowering influence of the government on citizens. The space beyond this ceiling is more likely than not, reflective of weak public institutions and an unwarranted subservience to public leaders. The government needs to acknowledge this boundary as the voice of the citizens in governance.
c. Democratic Space
The democratic space is the state of equilibrium where the public trusts the government and is not hesitant to express its mistrust. While there are many indicators to measure the breadth of this democratic space, I propose the elements of democracy by Larry Diamond as our basic indicators (Stanford).
i) Free and fair elections
As elections unfolded in various countries amidst the pandemic, we observed an evident scepticism for the ‘sanctity of the vote’. The Poland elections experienced major delays while the US elections ended with the storming of the Capitol. The postponement of elections or the exclusion of people from the voting process has historically undermined public trust. The current times have tested the ability of nations to fare well in these aspects. While voters fear the transmission of the virus in polling booths, election authorities fear security breaches emanating from online voting. The electoral systems should view this period as an opportunity to not only alleviate the risks of voting but also improve the robustness of elections. A hybrid model of technology and physical infrastructure to improve the accessibility of voting while minimizing security threats could improve electoral processes in the long run. The current scholarship on pandemic voting is inundated with the applicability of distributed ledger in elections. Although the technology offers appreciable benefits, it is still ahead of its time in terms of feasibility. Thus, election commissions can utilize existing technologies such as cryptography to enable “end-to-end” verifiable online and offline voting systems (Berke, 2020).
ii) Citizen participation
Apart from voting in elections, citizen participation in democracy is achieved through diverse channels such as the civil society or the gram panchayats . Although emergencies prompt consolidation of power in the upper echelons, these instances require a ‘bottom-up’ approach more than ever. The “territorial” aspects of COVID have reflected the importance of grassroots participation in policymaking (Falanga, 2020). As citizens share a lived experience within the community, their participation in the decision-making process can significantly lower the lag between the planning and implementation phases. We observe the positive effects of citizen participation in the Māori community of New Zealand. A gap between the flu vaccination coverage rates between māoris and non- māoris was addressed by the ministry of health in New Zealand through pop clinics by Māori health providers and GPs (Johnsen, 2020). Such efforts to catalyze civic participation in democratic governance could help world leaders to revive public trust. Technology and virtual mediums provide a platform for direct communication between leaders and citizens through town halls and citizen-led governance labs.
iii) Protection of human rights
One of the biggest threats faced by democracies today is the looming attack on human rights. While the concern for suspension of human rights is not new, the magnitude of this problem is aggravated by the attempts made to ‘legitimize’ this action under the guise of COVID. After the abrogation of Article 370, Jammu and Kashmir in India went under an unsubstantiated lockdown in 2019. The government imposed draconian laws on the people restricting their freedom to movement, communication, and education. As the pandemic set in, the authorities veiled this inhumane environment by referring to the restrictions as ‘social-distancing’ measures. With one soldier for every 9 individuals and one ventilator for every 71,000 people in Kashmir, the Confucian choice of trust over ‘weapon’ was clearly dismissed (Aijazi, 2020). The Civil Society and Press can play a major role in realigning these choices to protect human rights. While supranational organizations such as the United Nations Human Rights Council monitor the independence of the Civil Society and Press through various indicators, there has been a lack of action for faltering nations. The development of a ‘trust credit rating’ measuring the strength of the civil society and press in the signatory nations could be helpful to assign time-bound targets for continued UN support.
iv) The Rule of law
The rule of law provides a structured framework for the government and discourages the abuse of power. However, public emergencies may often lead to “a dangerous balancing act” (Zouev). The Muslim and Christian community in Sri Lanka expressed their discontent with the Supreme Court as it dismissed eleven families’ plea against forced COVID cremations (Petersen, 2020). Even though the World Health (WHO) Organization confirmed against the disbeliefs regarding burials, the government passed a mandatory policy to cremate bodies ‘suspected’ to have corona. The harsh intervention stripped the minorities of their dignity and the right to practise their religion. This case could have gotten even more complex if the WHO had ruled against burials. The rule of law would have stood in opposition to the necessary safety measures. Deviations from the rule of law should be justifiable and within a pre-defined time frame. Further, such deviations should be bridged systematically with the support of independent organizations such as the World Justice Project (WJP).
Conclusion
The world leaders have rightly pointed out that even though COVID might recede soon, we are already too late to prepare for another crisis. As governments strengthen their development programs to create sustainable business models, the doughnut economics framework provides a comprehensive auditing mechanism to track the transition of democracy between the various levels of public trust, distrust, and mistrust. Our gradual movement towards the sweet spot in the trust doughnut will catalyze economic resilience, growth, and stability in the coming years.”
For us, the larger takeaway is that trust cannot be treated as a soft variable in governance or economic development. It is a core condition for resilience, public cooperation and long-term institutional strength. The doughnut framework offers a useful way to think about this balance, where too little trust leads to dysfunction and too much unchecked authority weakens democratic accountability.
As governments prepare for future crises, public policy innovation will need to focus not only on efficiency, but also on participation, transparency and the protection of democratic space. Moving towards the “sweet spot” in the trust doughnut can help build institutions that are more responsive, more credible and better equipped to support sustainable growth.
